The past decades have seen a significant expansion in the scope and authority of international organisations (IOs), raising questions about who participates and is represented in the public contestation of IOs.
Introduction
The past three decades have seen a significant expansion in the scope and authority of international organisations (IOs), such as the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) . 1 This trend has paralleled an increase in the number of societal groups that publicly debate and contest these organisations, raising fundamental questions about the processes through which IOs become visible and controversial in domestic public debates. ! 4 information about IOs' policy-making in societies and the susceptibility of mass publics to elite manipulation. 12 Finally, the unequal distribution of awareness among mass publics may have implications for the visibility of citizen interests and, in turn, for the equality in representation of these interests 13 through societal groups acting as a "transmission belt"
between the global citizenry and IOs, 14 such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 15 corporations, 16 social movements, 17 and self-appointed spokespersons.
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This article asks what factors account for the variability in citizen awareness of IOs.
Awareness is defined as the extent to which an individual's knowledge is extensive and organised. 19 Since awareness has significant conceptual and empirical overlap with related concepts, such as political sophistication 20 and knowledge, 21 I use them interchangeably.
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Drawing from previous research on political psychology, political interest, and political Three hypotheses are derived from this argument and examined through a statistical analysis of a specific indicator of citizen awareness of IOs -the degree of factual knowledge about the UN Security Council. As discussed in more depth in the research design section, factual knowledge has advanced as our best measure of political awareness 23 or knowledge.
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The focus on the UN Security Council is motivated by three reasons. First, the Council is the only IO for which survey data on a factual question are readily available. Second, the Council is potentially the most powerful IO, 25 being "endowed with tremendous formal power by the UN Charter." 26 Its decisions can be expected to be relatively visible in domestic public debates, making it reasonable to assume that there is considerable variation in awareness across different societal groups instead of a skew towards a small group of citizens holding This is not to say that these are the only factors shaping individuals' knowledge of IOsjust that how much citizens know about IOs has mostly to do with their economic background and cosmopolitan identity. If attitude importance is in fact a cognitive mechanism improving knowledge about IOs, it leads us to expect that economic factors and cosmopolitan identity are crucial explanatory factors for citizen awareness of IOs, since these factors affect how important people perceive the IO to be for their lives. However, apart from these factors, a number of control variables included in the regression models have explanatory power. These alternative explanatory factors are also typical predictors of knowledge of domestic politics:
gender, education, and political institutions. The concluding section of this article discusses the implications of these findings taken together for the study of the politicization of IOs.
The antecedents of citizen awareness of IOs
Political knowledge is commonly conceived as cognitively stored, correct information about political facts. 30 Existing theories of political knowledge rest on the premise that people cannot retain all available information in memory owing to the complexity of the social world and personal limitations in time and cognitive resources. 31 Hence, people must be selective in their learning. To understand why some citizens learn more about IOs than others, we must consider the causal process through which people become motivated to seek information about various topics. A central mechanism raising people's motivation to learn about specific political issues or objects is attitude importance. 32 Attitude importance refers to a person's subjective interest in and concern about an attitude. People usually know when they care about an attitude towards a political issue or object, and they know when they are not especially interested in one. Attaching personal importance to an attitude leads people to use the attitude to process information, thereby acquiring higher levels of knowledge. 
Economic context
Theories of political knowledge typically assume in the tradition of Downs (1957) benefit segments of domestic societies in different ways. IMF-sponsored policy reforms have been found to increase income inequality and to decrease labour's share of income, even after controlling for a country's wealth. 47 Whether such reforms increase welfare by benefiting indicating that wealthy citizens have incentives to oppress conflict-prone aspects of IMF involvement in the public debate.
To provide an example from the area of international development, there is evidence that technical assistance programs financed by IOs, such as the Asian Development Bank, the European Union, the UN, and the World Bank, that aim to promote market liberalization, have in some cases not prevented governments or ruling elites to move backward from the achieved level of a market-based economy, favouring a relatively small and wealthy elite.
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Again, IOs' financial involvement may yield distributional benefits for the relatively wealthy and politically powerful, who, in turn, have incentives to prevent public contestation of these benefits.
In sum, we would expect richer people to have a keener interest in learning about IOs than poorer people, translating into the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. The higher a person's income in the distribution of national income, the more that person will be aware of IOs.
The expectation that individual income and knowledge are systematically related directs us towards a potential conditioning effect of income inequality. Taking cues from a number of 
Cosmopolitan identity
Furthermore, citizens may be more interested in an IO if that organisation's policy-making impinges on the lives of individuals or groups they identify with. 54 For example, residents of a high-income country that does not receive multilateral development aid may nonetheless see the relevance of IOs such as the IMF or the World Bank for reference groups or individuals in poorer countries they identify with, some of which may benefit from multilateral aid. In sum, attitude importance is conceived as the mechanism bringing about an effect of social identification with groups or individuals across borders that may be affected by an IO on knowledge about that organisation. This logic is summarized in the final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. People with a cosmopolitan identity are more likely to be more of IOs.
Research design
The argument developed above suggests that the determinants of individuals' knowledge of IOs exist on two levels: an individual level and a national or macro level. At the individual level, income and social identification affect the level of awareness of IOs. Higher levels of income (Hypothesis 1) and a cosmopolitan identity (Hyothesis 3) should be positively correlated with higher knowledge levels, and the positive effect of income should be magnified at greater levels of income inequality (Hypothesis 2). Income inequality thus provides a context factor within which individuals exist and which shapes the impact of income on awareness of IOs.
To examine the explanatory power of these hypotheses, one would, ideally, like to have data for a series of factual questions about different IOs to capture as much variation in citizen knowledge about IOs as possible. However, data on factual knowledge about IOs is only available for the UN Security Council. This article therefore uses individual-level data from the ASES and a range of cross-national datasets offering measures for country-level factors that may affect people's knowledge about the Council. As the ensuing sections discuss in Awareness is measured using the responses to the question of whether respondents know the awareness about the Council. In this respect, Converse emphasises that general, chronic political knowledge "measures must be carefully constructed and multi-item, but it does not take much imagination to realize that differences in knowledge of several … 'minor' facts are diagnostic of more profound differences in the amount and accuracy of contextual information voters bring to their judgments". 68 In the context of this study, we would expect the indicator awareness to primarily capture knowledge about the permanent member states of the Council, and to give some indication about how much people know about UN Security
Council policy-making more generally. since the division of power between the legislative and the executive in presidential systems may increase citizens' access points in the policy-making process. Likewise, federalism may increase citizens' opportunities for political access and therefore encourage political engagement. 81 In this study, the type of political system in a country is represented using a variable parliamentarism representing parliamentary systems (coded 2), semi-presidential systems (coded 1), and presidential systems (coded 0). In the data set, the Philippines is the only country with a purely presidential system. France, Indonesia, South Korea, Singapore,
and Taiwan are coded as semi-presidential systems. A second indicator variable for the type of political system in a country represents the degree of unitarism on a scale from 0 to 2. The most federal countries in this study, scoring 0 or 0.5, are Germany, Malaysia and the Philippines, whereas the most unitary countries in the data set, scoring 2 on the index, are
Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, South Korea, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, and the UK.
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Regression method
The relative effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable, awareness, are estimated through a series of multilevel models that adjust for the correlation of the error components at the individual and country level. As the dependent variable awareness takes on three ordered values, the multilevel models will estimate a latent variable as a linear function of the independent variables and two cut points. The main model is written as follows:
where Pr(y ij > s|x ij , ζ 1j ) is the cumulative probability that respondent i living in country j has a level of awareness UN Security Council politics that is higher than the threshold s; W are vectors for the individual-level controls; Z are vectors of country-level controls; ζ 1j is the random intercept of the cumulative logits that varies over countries j, which is included because survey responses are likely to vary across national contexts; and ε ij is the error term that is separate for country-level j. 
Empirical results
Before discussing the results from the multilevel models, I analyse the extent to which differences in awareness are owing to the fact that citizens live in different country contexts.
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) model that does not include any independent variables reveals that the random-intercept variance is estimated as 0.19, implying that about 5% of the variation in the level of awareness lies at the country level. 84 Unsurprisingly, this percentage is low given that the data are individual-level data, but indicates nonetheless that countrylevel factors should be included in the regression models to explain this part of the variation in knowledge about Council politics. 
The intra-class correlation, which reveals how much of the total variation in knowledge lies at the country level, is estimated according to the following equation ( Table 2 . Multilevel models predicting awareness of the UN Security Council! I begin by discussing the findings with regard to Hypothesis 1. The results from the models testing for a direct effect of income on awareness (models 1, 4, and 7) strongly endorse Hypothesis 1. An increase in an individual's income in the national income distribution appears indeed to matter for how much that individual knows about the Council.
Comparing two citizens that score similarly on all variables but one of which belongs to the next higher income quintile, the citizen belonging to the higher income quintile has a 17% greater odds of holding middle levels of awareness as compared to low levels of awareness (or high levels of awareness as compared to low or middle levels of awareness).
The evidence for Hypothesis 2 is mixed. Hypothesis 2 is tested through a product term between income and income inequality. positive -effect of income decreases. This suggests that in highly unequal societies, richer people still know more than poorer people, but the effect of income becomes weaker. This latter finding does not conform with the expectation expressed in Hypothesis 2, but ties in with previous literature arguing that inequality at very high levels might depress interest among the poor, and that rich people in very unequal societies do not have equal interest in IOs than rich people in medium unequal societies. As conflicts with poorer people about international political issues decrease, the more affluent have fewer incentives to engage politically as well. Income inequality
There is supportive evidence for Hypothesis 3. As the models including the indicator for cosmopolitan identity show, awareness is positively associated with cosmopolitan identity. A person with a cosmopolitan identity has 46% greater odds of holding more knowledge (see model 3). This result is in line with previous studies emphasising that a feeling of belonging to an all-inclusive worldwide group of people is an important predictor of public opinion towards international politics.
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With regard to the alternative explanations, the results suggest that men know more than women, reflecting a usual finding in the political knowledge literature. 90 However, the survey instrument to measure awareness of IOs may, as it is not based on gender-relevant items, gloss over important variation in awareness of the UN among men and women. There is some evidence that people know more about the Council if they have experiences 95 That the estimate for parliamentarism presented here does not conform to expectation may be due to the fact that among the 17 countries in the sample, only one is presidential and six are semi-presidential. This measure may not capture important variation in awareness of the UN in other presidential systems owing to its skewed distribution. Hence, reestimations of the models on other data may yield more convincing conclusions with regard to an effect of parliamentarism on political knowledge about IOs.
Robustness of the results
The findings presented in Table 2 are robust across a range of model specifications. First, all models that include the interaction term were replicated by including income as a random coefficient to allow for the possibility that the effect of income on awareness is not the same in different countries. The results remain robust (see Table B3 ).
Second, all models were replicated by including a measure for media exposure. News media may be a source of information about the politics of the Council, 96 but is positively correlated with and may hence be affected by income (r=0.177) and postsecondary education (r=0.215), respectively, and is therefore not included in the main regression table. The indicator measures the frequency of unintentional news media exposure and is based on two questions. The first question yields a dichotomous measure that equals 1 if respondents use the internet and 0 if otherwise, whereas the second question yields a dummy variable that is coded 1 if the respondent receives an international satellite or cable television. The resulting variable is an additive index of these two questions that ranges from 0 to 2, assuming that people who use the internet and receive international satellite or cable television are more likely to be incidentally exposed to international news. The results indicate that news media exposure increases awareness of the Council, while the remaining results remain robust to this change in model specification (see Appendix Table B4 ).
Third, the variable party pluralism may have biased the estimates presented in Table 2 owing to its moderately high correlations with district magnitude (r=-0.302) and parliamentarism (r=0.185), respectively. However, replicating all models by excluding party pluralism does not change the interpretation of the main regression models (see Appendix   Table B5 ).
Finally, two additional country-level measures are included to explore whether a country's participation in or exposure to the policy-making of the Council shapes citizens' knowledge about the Council. These measures are weakly or moderately correlated with nearly all country-level variables (see Appendix Table B2 and are therefore not included in Table 2 . The first measure captures the degree of country participation in the Council. It is coded 2 if a country is a permanent member of the Security Council (France and the UK), 1 if it was a temporary member in the year in which the survey data was collected (Ireland and Singapore), and 0 otherwise. 97 The coefficient of participation in the Council is significant in most models and in the concomitant model 10, and all other results remain robust (see Appendix Table B6 ). Substantively, these findings indicate that the more a country participates in the decision-making process of the Council, the more citizens of this country might know about the Council: citizens from countries that are relatively more involved in the Council have a 23% higher odds to know more about the Council (see model 10).
The second country-level measure captures citizens' exposure to the Council's decisionmaking. Residents of countries that have been the target of Council resolutions or have sent Figure 1 , suggesting that citizens in these three countries do not display a clear pattern where relatively many citizens have middle or high levels of awareness. However, the coefficient for exposure to the Council is statistically significant in some models, including the concomitant model 10, which might be diagnostic of an effect of exposure to the Council's authority on knowledge levels among some citizens.
Conclusion
To sum up, this article examines the sources of citizen awareness of IOs on the basis of evidence from the UN Security Council. Using an original dataset on 17 Asian and European countries, the article demonstrates that wealthier citizens are more aware of Council politics, and that income inequality depresses awareness among poorer people in the greater part of the countries that are being studied. Moreover, there is evidence that identification with a global community provides an impetus for individuals to acquire knowledge about the Council. With respect to the alternative explanations, the results tie in with previous literature focusing on domestic politics, suggesting that males and the better educated, 99 as well as people who live How do these results contribute to our understanding of citizen awareness of other IOs?
The UN Security Council is a central body in global governance with a mandate in international peace and security, whose policy-making bears heavily on development and aid. Consequently, they may attach more or less importance to their attitudes toward an IO.
Furthermore, income may not raise citizen awareness of all IOs in the same way. For example, the privileges and wealth of richer people may depend more on the policy-making of IOs with authority in the area of trade than on IOs with authority in the area of security, with implications for richer people's incentives to influence the public debate about IOs, and poorer people's knowledge levels. 
where wealth is relatively unequally distributed. This trend may be exacerbated if economic inequality was to rise among households in the future, as it has in both the developing world and in advanced industrialized countries over the past three decades. 95 -16411.40 -16445.51 -16027.45 -15989.03 -16000.16 -15995.47 -15977.22 -15986.55 -15938.94 Note: Estimated odds ratios from random-intercept multilevel ordered logit regression models, with states as second-level unit. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Number of individuals: 17191. Number of countries: 17. 
